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Abstract—In this paper, we consider coordinated movement of
a network of vehicles consisting a bounded number of malicious
agents, that is, vehicles must reach consensus in longitudinal
position and a common predefined velocity. The motions of
vehicles are modeled by double-integrator dynamics and commu-
nications over the network are asynchronous with delays. Each
normal vehicle updates its states by utilizing the information it
receives from vehicles in its vicinity. On the other hand, misbe-
having vehicles make updates arbitrarily and might threaten the
consensus within the network by intentionally changing their
moving direction or broadcasting faulty information in their
neighborhood. We propose an asynchronous updating strategy
for normal vehicles, based on filtering extreme values received
from neighboring vehicles, to save them from being misguided
by malicious vehicles. We show that there exist topological
constraints on the network in terms of graph robustness under
which the vehicles resiliently achieve coordinated movement.
Numerical simulations are provided to evaluate the results.
Index Terms—Cooperative adaptive cruise control, au-
tonomous vehicles, resilient consensus, graph robustness
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern intelligent vehicles are not only used for driving
but are processors that can perform complicated tasks and
connect to their surroundings [1]. The advent of ever-growing
Internet of Vehicles supported by a low latency communication
platform, along with cloud services, enables vehicles to trans-
mit and receive necessary information which can potentially
be used for traffic management and fuel efficiency, as well
as increasing the reliability of individual vehicle’s estimation
and control [2], [3]. However, as the vehicles become more
connected, they become more prone to adversarial actions and
cyber-attacks. To this end, devising defense mechanisms, or
using off-the-shelf methods in cyber-security, to increase the
security for both intra-vehicle networking and inter-vehicular
communications, is of great importance [4]–[7]. An efficient
defense mechanism must be able to prevent the attack as
much as possible, detect the attack in case of happening, and
satisfy a level of resilience in performing tasks despite the
existence of an attack [8]. The focus of the current paper is the
application of resilience methods to a Cooperative Adaptive
Cruise Control (CACC) strategy.
Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications can provide di-
rect data transfer with a much lower delay compared to radars
[9] and enable vehicles to drive closely with short inter-
vehicular distances, while collision avoidance algorithms assist
this strategy [10], [11]. This will increase the amount of road
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throughput and reduce the need for developing more road
networks. Cooperative adaptive cruise control, as one of the
applications of V2V communications, is among the widely
used methods in controlling highway traffic systems [12]. In
this approach, vehicles tend to follow specific speeds while
maintaining a safe distance from each other and at the same
time consume as little space as possible in the highway to
facilitate the traffic flow [13]. Since wireless communication
plays pivotal roles in CACC, we must make it resilient to
malicious actions [14]. Attack resilience algorithms in CACC
context refer to a class of actions taken to bypass the attacker
or mitigate its effect in the presence of an attack, in order
to improve performance in vehicle formation and velocity
tracking. While the attack mitigation can be addressed via
robust control techniques, in this paper, we investigate methods
to bypass the attacker in CACC in a distributed manner.
In multi-agent systems, various consensus problems have
been studied extensively in the past decade [15], [16] where
locally connected agents interact to achieve the global goal of
reaching a common state. In this literature, resilient consensus
points to the case where some of the agents in the network try
to deceive the others or are possibly crashed. Such malicious
agents might even prevent the normal vehicles from reaching
agreement by evading to execute the local state updating
rule. This type of consensus problems has a rich history in
distributed algorithms in the area of computer science (see,
e.g., [17]).
There are different techniques to relieve or counteract the
effects of attacks in multi-agent systems. In some solutions,
each agent identifies the adversaries within the network by
observing their past information – sort of fault detection
and isolation strategy [18]–[20]. However, usually in these
techniques, each agent needs global knowledge of the network
such as topology, which is not typically desirable in distributed
algorithms. It is shown that to overrule the effects of f
malicious vehicles, the network has to be at least (2f + 1)-
connected [18], [20].
In another class of distributed resilient consensus algo-
rithms, each agent utilizes a kind of filtering of the information
received from suspicious agents or those with out of range
values in its neighborhood at each time step. This class of al-
gorithms are often called Mean Subsequence Reduced (MSR)
algorithms, which was coined in [21] and have been used
extensively in the literature of computer science [17], [22]–
[26] as well as control [27]–[30]. In literature, convergence
of these algorithms is guaranteed by some constraints on the
topology. While the traditional connectivity measure is not
adequate for MSR-type algorithms, as is stated in [30], graph
robustness is a connectivity measure which has been frequently
used in different consensus problems to ensure that a network
achieves agreement [31], [32].
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2In this paper, we use resilient consensus notions introduced
in computer science literature [31] to solve a real world
problem in multi-vehicle coordinated movement. We consider
longitudinal cooperative cruise control in the presence of some
malicious vehicles in the network. Vehicles are supposed
to have second-order dynamics, which is a common model
for autonomous mobile vehicles. Also, each vehicle makes
updates based on the current or past positions and velocities
of itself and its neighbors and applies the control through
its acceleration. We developed our distributed algorithms in
an asynchronous setting, where each normal vehicle may
decide to update only occasionally with possibly delayed data
received from its neighbors. This is clearly a more vulnerable
situation, allowing the adversaries to take advantage by quickly
moving back and forth or sending false data to the reachable
vehicles. We suppose that the worst-case scenario may happen,
where the malicious vehicles are aware of the topology, updat-
ing times, the transmitted data packets by normal vehicles, and
even delays of communications. On the other hand, the normal
vehicles only have access to the data packets received directly
from their neighbors; thus they cannot predict adversaries’
behavior. We finally analyze the topology constraint needed
for the resilient cooperative cruise control problem.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section II, we
introduce the preliminaries and problem setup. Our main re-
sults including the update rule, the filtering algorithm, and the
required topology constraints are presented in Section III. We
illustrate the effectiveness of our strategy through a numerical
example in Section IV. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Graph Theory Notions
According to [15], we recall some preliminary concepts on
graphs. A digraph with n nodes (n > 1) is defined as G =
(V, E) with the set of nodes V = {1, . . . , n} and the set of
edges E ⊆ V × V . An incoming link from node j to node i
is denoted by (j, i) ∈ E . A graph is called complete if ∀i, j ∈
V, i 6= j : (i, j) ∈ E . For node i, the set of its neighbors
is denoted by Ni = {j|(j, i) ∈ E} and the number of its
neighbors, i.e. its degree, is denoted by di = |Ni|.
A path is a sequence (v1, v2, . . . , vp) in which (vi, vi+1) ∈
E , where p > 1 and i = 1, . . . , p − 1. If there is a path
between each pair of nodes in the directed graph G, it is
said to be strongly connected. The vertex connectivity K(G)
of the graph G is the minimum number of nodes such that
by removing them and all associated edges, the graph is not
strongly connected anymore. Then, the graph is said to be κ-
connected if K(G) ≥ κ. A directed graph is said to have a
directed spanning tree if there exist a node in the graph from
which there is a path to every other node. Note that we will
use the terms node and vehicle interchangeably in this paper.
For the MSR-type algorithms to achieve resilient consensus,
the critical topological notion is graph robustness, which is
a connectivity measure of graphs. Robust graphs were first
introduced in [30] for the analysis of resilient consensus of
first-order multi-vehicle systems.
Definition 1. ((r, s)-robust) The digraph G = (V, E) is (r, s)-
robust (r, s < n) if for every pair of nonempty disjoint subsets
T1, T2 ⊂ V , at least one of the following conditions is satisfied:
1. T rS1 = S1,
2. T rS2 = S2,
3. |T rS1 |+ |T rS2 | ≥ s,
where T rS` is the set of all nodes in S` which have at least
r incoming edges from outside of S`. In particular, graphs
which are (r, 1)-robust are called r-robust.
B. Physics of the System
Consider a network of vehicles driving in a road whose
communications are through the directed graph G. Each vehi-
cle i ∈ V has a second-order dynamic system given by
x˙i(t) = vi(t), v˙i(t) = ui(t), i = 1, . . . , n, (1)
where xi(t) ∈ R and vi(t) ∈ R are the position and the
velocity of the ith vehicle, respectively, and ui(t) is its control
input at time t ≥ 0. The discrete form of the dynamic system
(1) with sampling period T is represented as
xi[k + 1] = xi[k] + Tvi[k] +
T 2
2
ui[k],
vi[k + 1] = vi[k] + Tui[k], i = 1, . . . , n,
(2)
where xi[k], vi[k], and ui[k] are, respectively, the position, the
velocity, and the control input of the ith vehicle at t = kT for
k ∈ Z+ [16].
C. Problem Setup
In this paper, we investigate the coordinated movement
of networked vehicles in the sense that they reach a same
fixed velocity asymptotically leading to a formation with a
predefined (safe) inter-vehicular distance: xi[k]−xj [k]→ δij ,
vi[k] → r as k → ∞, ∀i, j ∈ V , where δij is the position
of nodes i relative to j and r is the desired velocity of the
networked vehicles which is assumed to be known for all.
Particularly, we study the case where some vehicles mal-
function due to failure, disturbances, or various cyber attacks.
Note that we do not consider different types of cyber attacks or
failures in this paper. We focus on the consequences of such
attacks or failures in consensus of the vehicle network. We
suppose some vehicles, here referred to malicious, lose their
control or intentionally send false data to their neighbors in
the network. In order to formulate the problem, we introduce
notions related to malicious vehicles and consensus in the
presence of such vehicles.
There are two possible situations in which malicious vehi-
cles might deceive the normal vehicles and prevent them from
reaching consensus.
i) Vehicles use an active sensing system: they can estimate
the state of their neighbors on their own (for example
using their 3D camera or LiDAR system).
ii) Vehicles use a passive sensing system: they trust the
information they receive from their neighbors (for exam-
ple using their GPS receiver or wireless communication
system which are susceptible to cyber attacks).
3In the first case, malicious vehicles can intentionally change
their moving direction or oscillate by avoiding any prescribed
update rule and choosing arbitrary control inputs. Accordingly,
all normal vehicles are supposed to follow. In the second case,
malicious vehicles can arbitrarily broadcast any information in
their neighborhood to deceive their neighbors. Note that the
dynamics for all vehicles still remain the same as (2).
Accordingly, we divide the vehicles into two groups of
malicious and normal vehicles as follows.
Definition 2. (Malicious and Normal Vehicles) Vehicle i is
called malicious if it can evade to follow any prescribed
algorithm for updating its control input or to broadcast false
state feedback to its neighbors. Otherwise, it is called normal.
The index set of malicious vehicles is denoted by M ⊂ V .
The numbers of normal vehicles and malicious vehicles are
denoted by nN and nM , respectively.
Furthermore, we assume that an upper bound is available
for the number of misbehaving vehicles in the entire network
or at least in each normal vehicle’s neighborhood.
Definition 3. (f -total Malicious Model) The network is f -
total malicious if the number nM of faulty vehicles is at most
f , i.e., nM ≤ f .
Definition 4. (f -local Malicious Model) The network is f -
local malicious if the number of malicious vehicles in the
neighborhood of each normal vehicle i is bounded by f , i.e.,
|Ni ∩M| ≤ f , i ∈ V/M.
Now, we formally introduce the notion of resilient coordi-
nated movement for the network of second-order vehicles as
follows.
Definition 5. (Resilient Coordinated Movement) For any pos-
sible set of malicious vehicles and any malicious inputs, the
network of vehicles is said to achieve resilient coordinated
movement if it holds that xi[k] − xj [k] → δij , vi[k] → r as
k → ∞, ∀i, j ∈ V , where δij is a predefined (safe) inter-
vehicular distance between the nodes i and j and r is the
desired velocity of the networked vehicles.
In practice, the vehicles might not be synchronized nor have
access to the current data of all neighbors simultaneously.
Thus, the solution must be robust against both communication
delays and asynchrony which are very important in real world
applications. Therefore, the main problem which we consider
in this paper is as follows:
Problem 1. Under the f -total malicious model, find a condi-
tion on the network topology so that the normal vehicles reach
the resilient coordinated movement using an asynchronous
update rule.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we present the update rule and MSR-type
algorithm by which the normal vehicles are able to reach
the coordinated movement in the presence of misbehaving
vehicles. We present the updating strategy compatible with
communication delays and asynchrony; so that the vehicles are
allowed to update at different times with delayed information.
Note that the updating strategies that are developed here must
be enhanced with the constraints on the topology of the
network which will be discussed in the next section.
A. Update Rule
We modified the algorithm and update rule proposed in [28]
called DP-MSR (double-integrator Position-based Mean Sub-
sequence Reduced) to suit the problem of resilient coordinated
movement. Each normal vehicle distributively uses the relative
position to its neighbors and its own velocity as the feedback.
To develop the update rule for coordinated movement, first
we use a change of variables as follows:
xi[k] = pi[k] + kTr
vi[k] = qi[k] + r.
(3)
Substituting the new variables into the dynamic system (2),
we have:
pi[k + 1] = pi[k] + Tqi[k] +
T 2
2
ui[k]
qi[k + 1] = qi[k] + Tui[k].
(4)
Based on the update rule proposed in [28], the network of
vehicles with the dynamic system (4), which is equivalent to
(1), can achieve consensus in the sense that pj [k]−pi[k]→ 0,
qi[k]→ 0 as k →∞, ∀i, j ∈ V by using the following update
rule:
ui[k] =
∑
j∈Ni
aij [k]
(
pj [k− τij [k]]−pi[k]− δij
)−αqi[k]. (5)
where τij [k] ∈ Z+ denotes the time delay corresponding to the
edge (j, i) at time k. For the sake of simplicity, pj [k−τij [k]]−
pi[k] is called the relative position of vehicle j to vehicle i
in the rest of the paper. Recalling the variable change of (3),
from the viewpoint of vehicle i, the most recent information
regarding vehicle j at time k is the position at time k− τij [k]
relative to its own current position. The delays are time varying
and may be different at each edge, but we assume the common
upper bound τ as
0 ≤ τij [k] ≤ τ, (j, i) ∈ E , k ∈ Z+. (6)
If all the vehicles in the network perform the update rule (5),
we have: pj [k−τij [k]]−pi[k]→ δij , qi[k]→ 0 or equivalently
xj [k− τij [k]]−xi[k]→ δij + τij [k]Tr, vi[k]→ r as k →∞,
∀i, j ∈ V \M.
Note that each normal vehicle becomes aware of the position
of each of its neighbors at least once in τ time steps, but
possibly at different time instants. In (5), it is also assumed
that vehicle i uses its own velocity without delay. The value
of τ in (6) can be arbitrary and need not be necessarily known
to the vehicles since this information is not used in the update
rule.
We also emphasize that, in fully asynchronous settings,
vehicles must also be facilitated with their own clocks [33].
However, we consider the so-called partially asynchronous
updating setting in this paper. This is a common term in
the literature for those update protocols with both delay and
4Algorithm 1: Asynchronous DP-MSR
At each step time k,
if vehicle i decides to make an update then
for j ∈ Ni
The vehicle i calculates pj [k− τij [k]]−pi[k]− δij
based on the most recent position values.
end
Vehicle i sorts the calculated values from the largest
to the smallest.
if there are less than f vehicles that
pj [k − τij [k]]− pi[k]− δij ≥ 0 then
The normal vehicle i ignores the incoming edges
from those vehicles.
else
The normal vehicle i ignores the incoming edges
from f vehicles counting from those having the
largest relative position values.
end
if there are less than f vehicles that
pj [k − τij [k]]− pi[k]− δij ≤ 0 then
The normal vehicle i ignores the incoming edges
from those vehicles.
else
The normal vehicle i ignores the incoming edges
from f vehicles counting from those having the
smallest relative position values.
end
Vehicle i applies the control input (5) by the
substitution aij [k] = 0 for edges (j, i) which are
ignored.
else
Vehicle i applies the control (5) where the position
values of its neighbors remain the same as time step
k − 1.
end
Result: ui[k]
different update times [34] and in fact contains some level
of synchrony regarding the same sampling times. Consider-
ing delays in communicated data packets to address partial
asynchrony has been studied in [33], [35], [36].
The malicious vehicles are assumed to be omniscient. Here,
it means that they have full knowledge of the topology, updat-
ing times, the transmitted data packets by normal vehicles, and
even delays τij [k] for all communication links and k ≥ 0. The
malicious vehicles might take advantage of this knowledge to
make deceiving back and forth movements or broadcast faulty
data packets to confuse and prevent the normal vehicles to
reach consensus.
The asynchronous DP-MSR algorithm which is executed by
each vehicle at each time step k is outlines in Algorithm 1.
B. Resilient Consensus Analysis
We present the main result of the paper in this section,
addressing resilient coordinated movement of the networked
vehicles via the asynchronous DP-MSR, executing by each
vehicle, in the presence of delayed information.
Theorem 1. Under the f -total malicious model, the network
of vehicles with second-order dynamics using the control in
(5) and the Asynchronous DP-MSR algorithm reaches resilient
coordinated movement with an exponential convergence rate,
if the underlying graph is (2f + 1)-robust, and if it reaches
resilient coordinated movement, the underlying graph is at
least (f + 1, f + 1)-robust.
Proof. (Sufficiency) The proof is similar to what is presented
in [31]. The proof there is presented for the position consensus
of the original dynamic system (1). Here, the dynamic system
is replaced with (4) and the result is valid for p[k] and q[k], i.e.
pj [k−τij [k]]−pi[k]→ δij , qi[k]→ 0, ∀i, j ∈ V \M. Equiva-
lently, according to (3), xj [k−τij [k]]−xi[k]→ δij+τij [k]Tr,
vi[k] → r as k → ∞, ∀i, j ∈ V \ M. Thus, the relative
positions of the vehicles are functions of their communica-
tion delays which is bounded by τ¯ . In fact all the vehicles
asymptotically reach a same velocity and meet a formation
with the inter-vehicular distance of δij which can fluctuate
inside a bounded interval: limk→∞ xj [k]− xi[k]− δij ≤ τ¯T r
and limk→∞ vi[k] = r, ∀i, j ∈ V \M.
(Necessity) We consider the synchronous networks without
communication delays as the proof of necessity is also valid
for the more general case of partially asynchronous networks
with communication delays. We prove by contradiction. Sup-
pose that the network is not (f + 1, f + 1)-robust. Then, there
are nonempty disjoint sets V1,V2 ⊂ V such that none of the
conditions 1–3 in Definition 1 holds. Suppose that pi[0] = a,
∀i ∈ V1 and pj [0] = b, ∀j ∈ V2, where a < b. Let p`[0] = c,
where a ≤ c ≤ b, ∀` ∈ V \ (V1 ∪ V2). We also suppose
that qi[0] = 0, ∀i ∈ V . From condition 3, we have that
|X f+1V1 | + |X
f+1
V2 | ≤ f . Suppose that all vehicles in X
f+1
V1
and X f+1V2 are malicious and keep their values constant. There
is at least one normal vehicle in V1 and one normal vehicle in
V2 by |X f+1V1 | < |V1| and |X
f+1
V2 | < |V2| because conditions
1 and 2 do not hold. These normal vehicles have f or fewer
neighbors outside of their own sets because they are not in
X f+1V1 or X
f+1
V2 . As a result, all normal vehicles in V1 and V2
update based only on the values inside V1 and V2 by removing
the values received from outside of their sets. This makes
their values unchanged at a and b. Hence, there will be no
agreement among the normal vehicles.
In the above results, we observe that there is a gap between
the sufficiency and the necessity conditions in Theorem 1.
However, this gap may be essential to the problem. This point
is illustrated by a 2f -robust graph in Fig. 1, which is not
resilient to f totally bounded adversarial vehicles as we will
formally discuss in what follows.
This graph is composed of four subgraphs Gi, i = 1, . . . , 4,
and each of them is a complete graph. The graph G1 consists
of 4f vehicles and the rest have f vehicles. Each vehicle in
G2 has incoming links from 2f vehicles of G1. Every vehicle
in G3 has f links from G1 and f links from G2. Likewise,
each vehicle of G4 has a link from every vehicle in G1 and f
incoming links from G2.
Note that the minimum degree for a 2f -robust graph is 2f .
However for this graph, the minimum degree of the vehicles is
2f + 1 or greater. This is an important point for the following
5G1
G3G2
G4
Fig. 1. A 2f -robust network in which vehicles fail to reach coordinated
movement with partial asynchrony and delayed information (each vehicle in
this figure is representative for a set of f vehicles that are strongly connected).
reason. If a normal vehicle has only 2f neighbors, it might
ignore all of them under the asynchronous DP-MSR algorithm,
which in turn means that the vehicle will keep its current state.
It is clear that if this happens for more than two vehicles in the
network, coordinated movement cannot take place. The next
proposition is based on this graph.
Proposition 1. There exists a 2f -robust network with the
minimum degree 2f + 1 under which normal vehicles may
not achieve resilient consensus by the asynchronous DP-MSR
algorithm.
Proof. We claim that the graph in Fig. 1 is 2f -robust and
(f + 1, f + 1)-robust at the same time, but resilient consensus
cannot be reached under the asynchronous DP-MSR. Suppose
that all vehicles in G2 are malicious. We show a scenario in
which by the DP-MSR algorithm, the values of the vehicles
in G3 and G4 never agree.
Note that G1 is 2f -robust because of Lemma 1 (v) (see
Appendix). By (iv) of this lemma, the graph obtained by
adding G2 is still 2f -robust, since there are 2f edges from
G1. Similarly, adding G3 and G4 and the required edges based
on (iv) of Lemma 1 also keeps the graph to be 2f -robust.
We assume vehicles have the following initial states for
k0 = 0 and the prior τ steps: pi[k0] = a − δi`2 , qi[k0] = 0,
i ∈ V3, p`[k0] = b + δi`2 , q`[k0] = 0, ` ∈ V4 and ph[k0] = c,
qh[k0] = 0, h ∈ V1, where a − δi`2 < c < b + δi`2 .
The malicious vehicles j ∈ V2 set pj [2m] = a − δi`2 and
pj [2m+1] = b+
δi`
2 , m ∈ Z+. The time delays are chosen by
the following scenario: τij [2m] = 0 and τij [2m + 1] = 1 for
(j, i) ∈ E , j ∈ V2, i ∈ V3, and m ∈ Z+. Also, τ`j [2m] = 1
and τ`j [2m + 1] = 0 for (j, `) ∈ E , j ∈ V2, ` ∈ V4, and
m ∈ Z+. All other links have no delay. Then, to the vehicles
in G3, the malicious vehicles appear to be stationary at the
state value a− δi`2 and to the vehicles in G4 at the state value
b+ δi`2 .
By executing the asynchronous DP-MSR at k = 0, the ve-
hicles in G3 will ignore every neighbor in G1 since a− δi`2 < c.
Thus, for i ∈ V3, pi[1] = a− δi`2 . At k = 1, the same happens
for the vehicles ` ∈ V4 and they stay at b + δi`2 . Since the
vehicles in G3 are not affected by any vehicles with state
values larger than a− δi`2 , they remain at their state value for
all future steps. The same holds among the normal vehicles in
the network, and therefore pi[k] = a− δi`2 and p`[k] = b+ δi`2
for all i ∈ V3 and ` ∈ V4. This shows failure in agreement of
all vehicles as limk→∞ p`[k]−pi[k] = δi`+(b−a) 6= δi`.
C. Further Results and Discussions
Here, we provide some discussions related to the results of
the paper and their potential extensions.
First, it is noteworthy that the result of Theorem 1 holds
for the f -local malicious model as well, which is now stated
as a corollary. This follows since in the proof of the theorem,
only the number of malicious vehicles in each normal vehicle’s
neighborhood plays a role.
Corollary 1. Under the f -local malicious model, the network
of vehicles with second-order dynamics using the control in
(5) and the asynchronous DP-MSR algorithm reaches resilient
coordinated movement, if the underlying graph is (2f + 1)-
robust.
Note that the results in this paper are all valid for the
second-order networks whose underlying graphs are fixed, i.e.
with time-invariant E . In [29], for the first-order synchronous
vehicle networks, there is a natural extension for the time-
varying G[k] and based on that G[k] = (V, E [k]) is enough to
be (f + 1, f + 1)-robust at each time k. The same condition
is valid here, again for second-order synchronous networks.
However, the assumption on robustness of the graph at each
time k is quite conservative and might bring difficulties in
practice. Here, we would like to state a new relaxed condition
for the partially asynchronous time-varying networks. The
following definition has a key role for this purpose:
Definition 6. (Jointly r-Robust) The time-varying graph
G[k] = (V, E [k]) is jointly r-robust if there exists a fixed `
such that the union of G[k] over each consecutive ` steps is
r-robust.
In a time-varying network, each normal vehicle i can use
the outdated links from τ time steps back whenever some
information are not available. Thus, the sufficient condition is
obtained with the following additional assumptions:
` ≤ τ. (7)
By the above discussions, the sufficient condition is presented
as below.
Corollary 2. Under the f -total/f -local malicious model, the
time-varying network of vehicles with second-order dynamics
using control input (5) and asynchronous DP-MSR algorithm
reaches resilient coordinated movement, if the underlying
graph is jointly (2f + 1)-robust under condition (7).
Now, we discuss the relation between the graph properties
proposed here for the resilient coordinated movement prob-
lem and those in standard consensus problems without any
adversaries [33], [37]–[39]. In this paper, we assumed that the
number of adversarial vehicles is upper bounded by f . By
removing all edges connected to malicious vehicles, we can
obtain a subgraph of G consisting of only the normal vehicles.
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Fig. 2. A graph which is (2, 2)-robust but not 3-robust.
By (vi) of Lemma 1 (see Appendix), this network becomes
(1, f + 1)-robust. Now, the obtained graph has a spanning
tree by (iv) of the same lemma. It is well known that under
such a graph, consensus can be achieved. It is also interesting
that the sufficient condition in Corollary 2 is consistent with
the consensus condition on time-varying networks known as
having jointly spanning tree [40].
It is further noted that in [21], [22], [25], [26], [29],
[41], malicious nodes are allowed to deny making any trans-
missions, which is often called omissive faults. Hence, the
normal vehicle i would wait to receive at least di − f values
from its neighbors before making an update. It should be
noted that omissive faults can also be tolerated by the MSR-
type algorithms. The malicious vehicles knowing that the
normal vehicles apply the asynchronous DP-MSR algorithm
might attempt to make this kind of attack to cause denial of
information for filtering the received values in Algorithm 1.
In such cases, if vehicle i does not receive the data packets
from mi[k] incoming neighbors at time k, then the parameter
of the asynchronous DP-MSR for that vehicle can be changed
from 2f to 2(f −mi[k]) assuming that vehicle i is aware of
di[k]. The topology analysis remains mostly the same.
Besides, the DP-MSR algorithms for f -total malicious mod-
els are resilient against another type of adversaries studied
in [42]. There, the attackers can create extra links in the
networks, but adding links does not change the value of f of
the networks. For example, in our problem, this can happen in
a highway when some additional vehicles are passing by the
connected vehicles network. However, note that the situation
is subtly different in the case with the f -local model. Adding
an extra link might increase the number of malicious vehicles
in a neighborhood of some normal vehicles. Accordingly, the
vehicles must be aware of the created links so as to remove
them along with the edges ignored in the asynchronous DP-
MSR algorithm.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
We consider a network of vehicles connected together on
the network illustrated in Fig. 2 with partially asynchronous
delayed setting. This graph is (2, 2)-robust (refer to Section VI
for more discussion). In this network, one of the vehicles is
set to be malicious. The bound on the number of malicious
vehicles is fixed at f = 1. The sampling period is set to
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Fig. 3. Position-time history of vehicles under (2, 2)-robust graph - coordi-
nated movement failed.
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
Fig. 4. Velocity-time history of vehicles under (2, 2)-robust graph - coordi-
nated movement failed.
be T = 0.3, and the parameter α = 0.9 in (5). Note that
we consider only longitudinal motion of vehicles and in this
example we assume that they are moving in parallel. Thus
xi ∈ V \M may cross over each other in the figures, while
the vehicles cannot collide.
Here, four normal vehicles periodically make updates within
each 12 time steps with various timings. Specifically, vehicles
1, 2, 3, and 5 make updates at time steps k = 12`+ 6, 12`+
9, 12`+11, 12`+4 for ` ∈ Z+, respectively. We assume that at
these time steps, there is no delay for their updates. However,
each vehicle deals with nonuniform time-varying delays (τ =
11) since the normal vehicles do not receive new information
at other time steps. The initial states of the vehicles are given
by
[
xT [0] vT [0]
]T
=
[
4 10 8 9 1 0 − 1 − 1 4 3]T . In
this network, the malicious vehicle 4 can move with different
velocities so that neighbour vehicles see it at different relative
locations. It is thus possible for this vehicle to misguide the
normal ones and divide them into multiple groups to prevent
them from arriving at single agreement. To this end, vehicle 4
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Fig. 5. Position-time history of vehicles under 3-robust graph - coordinated
movement succeeded.
oscillate to be appeared as: x4[2k] = 2+kTr and x4[2k+1] =
9 for all k ≥ 0.
In Figs. 3 and 4, the time responses of the positions and
velocities of normal vehicles are presented – the oscillatory
trajectory of vehicle 4 is not shown. As expected, although the
underlying network is (2, 2)-robust, as a necessary condition,
the normal vehicles do not come to consensus among their
positions. This is an interesting situation since the asyn-
chronous DP-MSR cannot prevent the normal vehicles from
being deceived by the malicious vehicle. Fig. 3 indicates
that in fact vehicles are divided into two groups and move
with a relative distance because of the malicious behavior
of vehicle 4, oscillating to be appeared in various relative
positions.
In the next simulation example, we modified the graph
structure by adding enough edges to obtain a 3-robust graph
(which is 2f+1-robust in this case). To this end, we conducted
the same simulation on the complete graph with 5 nodes,
which is the only 3-robust graph with 5 nodes. The time
responses in Fig. 5 verify the sufficient condition of Theorem 1
for the partially asynchronous setting. The oscillations of the
normal vehicles in asynchronous updating is visible from the
responses in their velocities shown in Figs. 4 and 6.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the problem of resilient coordinated
movement of a network of connected vehicles with second-
order longitudinal dynamics, where the maximum number of
malicious vehicles in the network is determined and known to
the vehicles. We have proposed an MSR-type algorithm for the
normal vehicles to reach consensus on their relative positions
and a predefined target velocity. A necessary and sufficient
condition in terms of robust topology of coordinated vehicles
to reach consensus has been developed. Communications in
the network are considered to be partially asynchronous and
with bounded delays.
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Fig. 6. Velocity-time history of vehicles under 3-robust graph - coordinated
movement succeeded.
In future research, we would like to consider 2D coordinated
movement of connected vehicles and develop appropriate
updating algorithms.
VI. APPENDIX
The following lemma helps to have a better understanding
of (r, s)-robust graphs [43] introduced in Definition 1.
Lemma 1. For an (r, s)-robust graph G, the followings hold:
(i) G is (r′, s′)-robust, where 0 ≤ r′ ≤ r and 1 ≤ s′ ≤ s,
and in particular, it is r-robust.
(ii) G is (r − 1, s+ 1)-robust.
(iii) G is at least r-connected, but an r-connected graph is
not necessarily r-robust.
(iv) G has a directed spanning tree.
(v) r ≤ dn/2e. Also, if G is a complete graph, then it is
(r′, s)-robust for all 0 < r′ ≤ dn/2e and 1 ≤ s ≤ n.
(vi) The graph G′ = (V, E0) is (r − p, s)-robust, when G′ is
formed by removing at most p edges from neighbors of
each node in V , where p < r.
(vii) The graph G′ = (V ∪ {v0}, E ∪ E0), where v0 is a node
added to G and E0 is the edge set related to v0, is r-
robust if dv0 ≥ r + s− 1.
Moreover, a graph is (r, s)-robust if it is (r + s− 1)-robust.
It is clear that (r, s)-robustness is more restrictive than r-
robustness. The graph with five nodes in Fig. 2 can be shown
to be (2, 2)-robust, but not 3-robust. In general, to determine
if a given graph has a robustness property is computationally
difficult since the problem involves combinatorial aspects.
However, it is known that random graphs possess robustness
when their size tends to infinity [44].
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